# CVE-2026-84869: ConnectWise ScreenConnect, is it exploitable where you run it

Ledger entry, disclosed 3 Sep 2026, sources read 19 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** CVE-2026-84869 affects ConnectWise ScreenConnect and was disclosed 3 Sep 2026 with a CVSS score of 9.9. Exposure needs these conditions: an endpoint runs a ScreenConnect client older than 26.6.5; a role holds TransferFiles and an attacker controls a session peer. CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 11 Sep 2026.

## What the flaw is

Older ScreenConnect clients in Support and Access sessions could process file-transfer actions through an active session without proper authorization or Host confirmation (CWE-862 and CWE-269). Under certain circumstances, files could be transferred to and run on the Host client system, including through elevated execution.

The server is not affected. The exposed systems are the endpoints and technician workstations that run the client. ConnectWise says it cannot give more detail because of the sensitive nature of the flaw.

## Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it

| Condition for exposure | How to check it on your system |
| --- | --- |
| an endpoint runs a ScreenConnect client older than 26.6.5 | On a Windows host read the client file version: `(Get-Item "C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client (*)\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe").VersionInfo.FileVersion`. At fleet scale, run the same query through your RMM, EDR or an Intune remediation script and collect every result, then list the hosts below 26.6.5. Cloud and on-premises are both in scope; Cloud servers were updated by ConnectWise but clients still need a reinstall. The server is not affected, and updating the server does not update clients. ConnectWise documents no version command for macOS or Linux clients. Read the version from your MDM or package inventory, and where none shows it, reinstall the client from the updated server, which ConnectWise says is required for host clients. |
| a role holds TransferFiles and an attacker controls a session peer | Administration > Security > Roles: edit each role, review each session group with permissions (shown in bold), and check Scoped Permissions for TransferFiles (TransferFilesInSession on legacy versions). List the users in those roles; any one of them, or an attacker holding their account, can start a session. The peer can also be a Guest who joins a session a technician then opens. In Administration > Audit log, look for accounts or Guests you do not recognize, including blank-named guest sessions, and confirm MFA is on for technician accounts. |

## Affected and fixed versions

| Deployment | Affected | Fixed |
| --- | --- | --- |
| On-premises ScreenConnect | Versions prior to 26.6.5 (clients) | 26.6.5 or later; source versions must be 25.4 or later to upgrade |
| Cloud ScreenConnect | Clients prior to 26.6.5 | Servers updated by ConnectWise; reinstall host clients and update access agents |
| Automate-integrated on-premises | Versions prior to 26.6.5 | 26.6.5 via Automate Product Updates (active Automate Assurance subscription) |

NVD's CPE range ends before 26.6.5.9742, a more specific form of the same release number; the vendor bulletin states 26.6.5. Treat any client below 26.6.5 as affected. Access agents must also be updated after upgrading.

## If the fix cannot go in yet

- Upgrade to 26.6.5 or later (primary fix). If your license is out of maintenance, renew or upgrade it first. Cost: an upgrade window and reinstalling host clients.
- Interim, per ConnectWise: in Administration > Security > Roles, deselect TransferFiles (TransferFilesInSession on legacy versions) for every session group in every role, then save. Cost: technicians can no longer transfer files in sessions. It reduces exposure and does not replace the update.
- After patching: review users and remove any not recognized, review roles and permissions, change passwords and enable MFA.
- If you suspect compromise: isolate the technician workstations and endpoints that ran a client older than 26.6.5, back them up for analysis, and keep them offline until investigated, rebuilt and patched. The server is not vulnerable to this CVE, so server isolation applies only if you also suspect the server, for example through the third-party extension campaign that ConnectWise describes for on-premises servers. Reset passwords, review the audit log and force all technicians to sign back in (ConnectWise security alert checklist).

## What to look for

- Server side, the CVE-specific check (Huntress, 16 Nov 2026): a file transfer by a Guest leaves RanFiles (EventType 85) or SentFiles (EventType 86) events in the server's audit log and in App_Data\Session.db (work on a copy), sent by a guest connection (ProcessType = 2). Look for repeated requests for update.bat or update_<8 hex>.bat from blank-named sessions, marker.txt, Run-Lateral.bat, svc_payload.cmd, and any file path that contains ../ or a Startup folder path. Then check whether a Host connection (ProcessType = 1) was open at that moment: that overlap is the exposure.
- On technician workstations (Huntress): ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe, or your branded client, running .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js or .txt files from a Documents\...\Temp folder; unexpected files in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup, especially Sync.bat; folders %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_<8 hex> and files %TEMP%\wupdate_<8 hex>.msi; WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe or any client whose command line points at a relay you do not own, often on port 8041.
- Indicators from Huntress's 12 Nov 2026 case: payload host and relay masterdarky[.]com (resolving to 194[.]15[.]36[.]33), installer WindowsUpdate.msi, SHA-256 of the rogue client f8871b1561d5c77c297378a7f49c84de52a01ff297395544f0e95d13ef972841, first-stage file update_224ac089.bat with argument xhsdf_wrwerhjf_shhdga, and guest source addresses 91[.]224[.]92[.]167, 193[.]26[.]115[.]63, 57[.]128[.]131[.]66, 91[.]224[.]92[.]83 and 107[.]148[.]223[.]37.
- Separate from this CVE: Huntress's Aug and Sep 2026 reports of rogue ScreenConnect clients spawning wscript.exe to run 1.vbs to 4.vbs, with a WindowsServiceHost Run key, describe different intrusions that Huntress did not tie to this CVE. Treat those as general hunting indicators.
- ConnectWise has published no indicators specific to this CVE. For its Nov 2026 third-party extension campaign it advises reviewing authentication, extension installation, administrative, Run Command and Toolbox records, revoking active web sessions, and investigating endpoints with EDR rather than ScreenConnect.

## Timeline

| Date | Event | Source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 3 Sep 2026 | ConnectWise publishes the interim Guest File Transfer advisory with the TransferFiles mitigation. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories) |
| 8 Sep 2026 | ConnectWise releases 26.6.5 and the bulletin for CVE-2026-84869, and NVD publishes the CVE. Huntress updates its Aug-Sep post on rogue ScreenConnect clients to say ConnectWise has fixed CVE-2026-84869; the post does not say its August incidents used the CVE. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-09-08-screenconnect-bulletin) |
| 9 Sep 2026 | ConnectWise updates the interim advisory to point to the security bulletin. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories) |
| 10 Sep 2026 | CISA's SSVC data in the NVD record marks exploitation as active. | [source](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-84869) |
| 11 Sep 2026 | CISA adds the CVE to KEV, due date 14 Sep 2026. | [source](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-84869) |
| 13 Nov 2026 | ConnectWise tells all partners to verify every technician client runs 26.6.5 or later and to disable listed third-party extensions. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories) |
| 16 Nov 2026 | ConnectWise reports its investigation complete and repeats the client version requirement. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories) |
| 16 Nov 2026 | Huntress publishes its confirmation of in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-84869: a guest-pushed batch file ran on an MSP technician's workstation on 12 Nov 2026. It dates the first logged file push to a technician client to 19 Oct 2026 and a count of 688,000 guest run-file requests to the period from 20 Oct 2026. | [source](https://www.huntress.com/blog/cve-2026-84869-screenconnect-technician-exploitation) |

The earliest dated mark of exploitation is CISA's, on 10 Sep 2026, 7 days after disclosure; exploitation may have begun earlier.

## Exploitation reported so far

ConnectWise rates the bulletin Priority 1 High, its label for flaws being targeted or at higher risk of being targeted, and has published no date of first exploitation. The 10 Sep 2026 date is CISA's mark, not an observed attack, so the days-from-disclosure figure counts from ConnectWise's 3 Sep advisory to that mark; the first attack that an outside observer dated is Huntress's 19 Oct 2026 near-miss.

Huntress says the 12 Nov 2026 batch file installed a rogue ScreenConnect client within about 9 seconds. After the 19 Oct Run-Lateral.bat push, which Huntress counts as a near-miss and not an exposure, pushes while a technician was connected followed on 23, 24 and 27 Oct 2026, including a path-traversal attempt aimed at a Startup folder. In Nov 2026 ConnectWise said third-party researchers observed a toolkit (SCKit) built to spread from infected endpoints to connecting technician workstations, and that client versions 26.6.5 and later block that spread technique. Huntress says SCKit appears to use a vulnerable third-party server extension and not this CVE directly.

## Why agent investigation settles it

Exposure lives in the client on each endpoint, not the server, so the server version settles nothing. What decides it is each client's version together with which roles can transfer files and whether the session audit log shows a peer you do not recognize. That takes a client inventory plus an audit-log investigation.

## Related pages

- [CVE-2026-82329: JFrog Artifactory](/ledger/cve-2026-82329/)
- [CVE-2026-87491: Google Chromium V8](/ledger/cve-2026-87491/)
- [CVE-2026-80521: Linux kernel](/ledger/cve-2026-80521/)

## Sources

- CVE-2026-84869: NVD record: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-84869 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CVE-2026-84869: CISA KEV entry (KEV feed 2026.11.18): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-84869 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CVE-2026-84869: vendor advisory (ConnectWise security bulletin): https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-09-08-screenconnect-bulletin (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CVE-2026-84869: vendor advisory (ConnectWise disclosures repo): https://github.com/ConnectWise-Advisories/Disclosures/tree/main/CVE-2026-84869 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CVE-2026-84869: vendor advisories page (interim advisory 3 Sep and Nov 2026 updates): https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CVE-2026-84869: Huntress report on rogue ScreenConnect installations (updated 8 Sep 2026): https://www.huntress.com/blog/rogue-screenconnect-installations (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CVE-2026-84869: Huntress report, CVE-2026-84869 exploited against MSP technician accounts, published 16 Nov 2026: https://www.huntress.com/blog/cve-2026-84869-screenconnect-technician-exploitation (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://reachabilityanalysis.com/ledger/cve-2026-84869/
