A vulnerable system holds a flaw; an exploitable one also meets every condition an attacker needs
Three words describe three different facts
NIST's glossary defines a vulnerability as a "Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source" (FIPS 200, from CNSSI 4009). The definition says "could". It describes what a flaw permits in principle. It says nothing about whether this system, as configured today, lets anyone do it.
CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog uses a different test. A CVE enters the catalog when "There is reliable evidence that the vulnerability has been actively exploited in the wild" (alongside an assigned CVE ID and a clear remediation action). That is a statement about attackers somewhere, not about your host.
Exploitable sits between the two. It is the claim that every precondition the advisory names is true on one specific system. Each state has its own question and its own evidence.
Scroll the table sideways for more columns
| State | Question | Answered by | Who usually holds the fact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vulnerable | Does the affected code exist here? | Installed version or build, compared with the advisory's ranges | Scanner, package manager, SBOM |
| Exploitable here | Does every precondition hold on this system? | Configuration, enabled features, network path, accounts, the running process | System owner, network team |
| Exploited | Is there reliable evidence of use against anyone? | A KEV listing, a vendor statement, incident reports | CISA, the vendor, threat intelligence |
A worked case: CVE-2026-123158 on six SSH hosts
OpenSSH 10.6p2 was released on 5 Nov 2026. NVD published CVE-2026-123158 the same day: sshd "on Linux, when musl libc is used without PAM, lacks a workaround for a password authentication bypass", and for some account configurations "any password between 256 and 1024 characters succeeds". CISA added it to KEV on 9 Nov 2026, four days later. So on 9 Nov the exploited fact is settled for every host. The other two facts are not. Alpine and the researcher give the length as 257 to 1024 bytes where NVD says 256 to 1024 characters; this page uses Alpine's figure, because it is the vendor advisory for the hosts below.
The Alpine Linux advisory of 5 Nov 2026 names Alpine 3.16 through 3.24 and edge as affected. Fixed openssh-server packages by branch: edge 10.6_p2-r0, 3.24 10.3_p1-r2, 3.23 10.2_p1-r1, 3.22 10.0_p1-r11, 3.21 9.9_p2-r1, 3.20 9.7_p1-r6, 3.19 9.6_p1-r3, 3.18 9.3_p2-r4, 3.17 9.1_p1-r7 and 3.16 9.0_p1-r6. The advisory lists what must hold together on a host. Each condition has a command that answers it, and an owner who runs it and keeps the output. Run the commands as root where /etc/shadow is read:
- Platform team, musl libc, not glibc: ldd /usr/sbin/sshd | grep -i musl
- Platform team, no PAM in use: Alpine's openssh-server package is built without PAM; openssh-server-pam with UsePAM no counts as no PAM. Run sshd -T | grep -i usepam on the PAM package.
- System owner for the setting, network team for the path: sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication must print yes, and the SSH port must be reachable from where an attacker can stand.
- System owner, an account whose password field is "*" (root on Alpine base images, key-only users, the alpine user in tiny-cloud images):
awk -F: '$2=="*" {print $1}' /etc/shadow - System owner, at least one local account with a $5$ or $6$ crypt hash:
awk -F: '$2 ~ /^\$[56]\$/ {n++} END {print n+0}' /etc/shadow - Platform team, the running sshd is the fixed build. Alpine states that sshd must be restarted after the package upgrade, because upgrading alone does not replace the running daemon.
Five of six hosts are flagged and two can be attacked
The estate below was built for this page to show the spread. A scanner that compares the openssh package version with the range "before 10.6p2" flags five of the six hosts. Two are exploitable. One of those two is not flagged at all.
Host lab-5 is the case a version count gets backwards. Its package was upgraded to the fixed build, so the scanner is quiet, yet sshd was never restarted. The old daemon still answers on port 22 with password login on and the account conditions met.
Scroll the table sideways for more columns
| Host | Setup | Version-only scanner | Precondition that decided it | State on 19 Nov 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bastion-1 | Alpine 3.22, openssh-server before 10.0_p1-r11, password login on, port 22 open to the internet, root:* and a deploy account with a $6$ hash | Flags | None fail | Exploitable, and exploited elsewhere (KEV 9 Nov 2026) |
| build-2 | Same image as bastion-1 | Flags | PasswordAuthentication is no | Vulnerable, not exploitable |
| app-3 | Ubuntu, glibc, PAM in use, OpenSSH version number below 10.6p2 | Flags | Not musl, PAM in use; NVD limits the flaw to musl without PAM | Not affected, a scanner false positive |
| edge-4 | Alpine 3.23, openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yes | Flags | UsePAM is yes | Not affected |
| lab-5 | Alpine 3.22, package upgraded to 10.0_p1-r11 or later, sshd not restarted, same accounts and settings as bastion-1 | Quiet | Running process is still the old build | Exploitable |
| ci-6 | Alpine container image with openssh-server installed, sshd never started | Flags | No sshd process | Not exposed |
Exploited can attach to a low CVSS score or a narrow precondition
KEV listing and exploitability are separate, and they do not move together. CVE-2026-41709 in VMware ESX is rated Low by Broadcom, with a CVSS v3 base score of 2.7. Broadcom's advisory VMSA-2026-0006 says "A malicious administrator could exploit this issue to perform certain operations without them being logged." The advisory was first published on 29 Jul 2026. CISA listed the CVE on 28 Oct 2026, 91 days later. The precondition, an attacker who is already an ESX administrator, did not change. The reason to act did.
CVE-2026-0322 in PAN-OS was listed in KEV on its publication day, 14 Oct 2026. Palo Alto Networks describes an "authenticated attacker with network access" to the management interface, and says the risk "is minimized by restricting access to the management interface to only trusted internal IP addresses". A firewall whose management plane is closed to untrusted networks is vulnerable, and is exploited elsewhere, but is not exploitable from outside.
CVE-2026-76460 in Cisco ISE sits at the other end. Cisco says it affects ISE and ISE-PIC "regardless of device configuration", so the only conditions are the release and a reachable API. For a finding like that, vulnerable and exploitable are close to the same set.
A version range can be wider or narrower than the exposure
NVD describes CVE-2026-75604 in Next.js as affecting applications "using Pages Router or App Router without Cache Components on Windows-hosted servers", from 13.4.0 until the fixes in 15.5.24 and 16.3.3. A Next.js 15.2 application on a Linux container is inside the version range and outside the condition. It is not in the KEV feed read on 19 Nov 2026.
The reverse also happens, as the lab-5 row shows: a version check says patched while the live process is not. In both directions the version is evidence about files, and the advisory's preconditions are about a running system.
Record the state, the deciding fact and the date
The four-question tool on the home page asks the same things in a fixed order: is the code called, can the service be reached, is a control in front of it, is exploitation known. Starting it from the CVE-2026-123158 ledger entry sets exploitation known to yes, which is true of every host here. The per-host answers to the other three are the facts in the table above, and a not-sure on reach or control sends the finding to the method the tool names.
A decision can be reviewed and reversed only if it names its fact. The record for bastion-1 and build-2 on 19 Nov 2026 has these fields:
- Finding: CVE-2026-123158, OpenSSH, bastion-1 and build-2.
- State: bastion-1 exploitable; build-2 vulnerable, not exploitable.
- Deciding fact: build-2 sshd -T prints passwordauthentication no. bastion-1 prints yes, with root:* and one $6$ hash present.
- Evidence: command output saved with the host name and time; KEV listing dated 9 Nov 2026.
- Action and due date: patch bastion-1 and restart sshd now; build-2 follows the normal patch cycle.
- Recheck when: the advisory is revised, or PasswordAuthentication changes on build-2.
Related pages
Sources
- NIST CSRC glossary: vulnerability, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA: Reducing the significant risk of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV criteria), read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA KEV catalog JSON feed (release 2026.11.18), read 19 Nov 2026
- NVD record for CVE-2026-123158, read 19 Nov 2026
- OpenSSH release notes, 10.6p2, read 19 Nov 2026
- Alpine Linux advisory, OpenSSH password authentication bypass, 5 Nov 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
- Broadcom advisory VMSA-2026-0006 (CVE-2026-41709), read 19 Nov 2026
- Palo Alto Networks advisory for CVE-2026-0322, read 19 Nov 2026
- Cisco advisory cisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5 (CVE-2026-76460), read 19 Nov 2026
- NVD record for CVE-2026-75604, read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.