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Reachability Analysis

Reachability analysis in four questions: which of your findings can be exploited

Walk one finding through four questions

1Is the vulnerable code called?
Static and runtime reachability prove this.
2Can the service be reached?
Attack-path analysis models the route.
3Is a control in front of it?
Attack-path analysis and agent investigation read controls.
4Is exploitation known?
Known-exploited lists record it.

Showing the newest entry with its own page. Change any answer or pick another entry; the full mapping holds all 81 combinations.

This finding

CVE-2026-123158

OpenBSD OpenSSH

D+2

The ledger records Static reachability and configuration reads for it: Exposure rests on build and configuration facts that a read of the package and config settles: musl, no PAM, password authentication on, and a * account next to a hashed account. Those are static properties of the host, so a scan of the build and /etc/shadow gives the answer before any attack arrives, and a severity score or exploit feed cannot say which hosts meet all of them.

14 of 37 entries settle on the same method.

Method that settles it

Static reachability and configuration reads

or Runtime reachability and live-state reads on a running workload

Rule 5 Reached: yes, no control in front, and the code question is the only one not sure.

What it proves
That a call path exists from your code to the vulnerable function, shown step by step where one is found, and that the version, packaging and configuration facts in the CVE record hold or fail in the build.
What it misses
Network exposure, identity, controls, whether the code is deployed and running, and any setting changed after the read.

Evidence to keep

The call path from your code to the vulnerable function, with the path shown; or, from a running workload, whether the vulnerable package or function was loaded or executed, with the observation window.

Static reachability reads code and build facts; runtime reachability reads a running workload and does not see code paths left unexercised during the window.

Days from disclosure to first exploitation

All 37 ledger entries by days from disclosure to first observed exploitation: 2 before disclosure, 10 on the day, 21 after, and 4 with no dated report. The median is 2 days. A filled square was exploited on or before disclosure day.

The ledger, all 37 entries

exposed not exposed the question the record leaves open. Open a product for the reason its method settles it.

DisclosedCVEProductDaysCodeReachControlKnownSettled by
CVE-2026-123158OpenBSD OpenSSH
OpenBSD OpenSSH

Exposure rests on build and configuration facts that a read of the package and config settles: musl, no PAM, password authentication on, and a * account next to a hashed account. Those are static properties of the host, so a scan of the build and /etc/shadow gives the answer before any attack arrives, and a severity score or exploit feed cannot say which hosts meet all of them.

D+2openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-19868SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN
SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN

Whether the bypass applies comes down to configuration: SAML on SSLVPN logins plus at least one active LDAP, RADIUS or TACACS+ server, on an affected firmware. Those are facts you can read from the firewall, so a static check of the device settings settles exposure without any traffic analysis. Where all three hold, the exploited status makes the upgrade urgent.

D+1openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-119977WordPress Core
WordPress Core

Exposure needs an upgrade running at that moment and an upgrade folder the attacker can reach, which are runtime conditions. Checking whether the staging path answers over HTTP and whether automatic updates are on tells you more than the version number does. The fixed version still ends the question.

D+6openyesnoyesRuntime reachability
CVE-2026-76418Cisco Secure Firewall ASA and FTD
Cisco Secure Firewall ASA and FTD

Exposure needs a vulnerable release, SSL VPN enabled on an interface and secondary authentication in a tunnel group in scope. The version and both settings show in the running configuration, so a static check of the config settles those three exactly. Whether the login service is reachable depends on the network path, so test it from an untrusted network. A device that matches all of these is exposed to a no-login attack that is already being used.

D+0openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-109618PHP Group PHP
PHP Group PHP

Exposure needs a chain: an unpatched build, a web SAPI, an unauthenticated route to PHP, and a finite memory limit. Tracing that path on each host, rather than reading the 9.8 base score, shows which servers can be hit. Where the path is open, the version check ends the question.

D+0yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-109619PHP Group PHP
PHP Group PHP

Exploitation needs a producer event in one request and a consumer in a later request on the same worker. Whether both exist depends on the PHP branch, the SAPI, the INI settings and the application's error paths, so tracing that path on each deployment settles exposure. Where the build is fixed, the path no longer matters.

D+5yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-111497Node.js Brotli decoder
Node.js Brotli decoder

Whether a vulnerable decoder runs on attacker-influenced data is a question about versions and code paths: which Node.js or library build you run, and which routes decompress request bodies or fetch outside URLs. Static inventory answers both. KEV tells you attackers are active, but only the inventory tells you which of your services can be hit.

D+5openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-102764BeyondTrust Remote Support
BeyondTrust Remote Support

Exposure depends on two facts you can read: the installed Remote Support version and whether the BT26-05 patch is applied, plus whether the appliance is reachable. Because exploitation preceded the patch, an exposed unpatched appliance also needs a compromise check using the detection list.

D-47openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-0322Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS
Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS

Exposure needs two things at once: a network path to the management interface and a valid high-privilege account. The version row tells you if the code is present, but only the reachability and account rows tell you whether an attacker can use it. An attack-path view answers that, and the permitted-IP and administrator lists are where to read it.

D+0yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-97229GitLab CE/EE
GitLab CE/EE

Exposure needs the build to be unfixed and then a route for an attacker to the CI lint, GraphQL or pipeline paths: network reach to the web and API ports, then an open sign-up, a token or a public project. The version read settles the first part. Mapping who can reach the instance and create accounts or tokens settles the second, which GitLab has not described. KEV and a public exploit module mean a reachable instance on an unfixed build should be patched and checked for compromise at once.

D+1yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-21589Atlassian Data Center products
Atlassian Data Center products

Whether you are exposed comes down to checkable facts: the product version against the fixed build, whether the web application is reachable, whether a rewrite or WAF rule is in place, and whether sensitive files sit under the web root. Each can be read from the host or the network without running an attack. Because it is known exploited, an affected reachable instance should be patched first and then reviewed for exposed credentials.

D+10openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-88779Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway
Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway

Exposure depends on the build and on one configuration fact: whether the appliance acts as a SAML SP or IdP. Both are readable from the appliance with `show ns version` and a grep of the running configuration. KEV shows attacks happened, but only the configuration read tells you whether your appliance can be hit.

D+1openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-104286Fortinet FortiMail
Fortinet FortiMail

Exposure needs an affected FortiMail build, the IBE service on, and a web interface the attacker can reach. A version read, an IBE setting read and a reachability test answer all three on each appliance. Fortinet and CISA confirm active use, so any appliance that passes all three checks should be treated as possibly compromised and checked against the log indicators.

D+0openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-94545Vercel Satori and Next.js
Vercel Satori and Next.js

Exposure needs an affected version on the Node.js ImageResponse and a data flow from user input into the SVG tree. Both are facts about the code, so tracing the data flow in the source settles it. A severity score cannot tell you this, since the two vendors rate the same flaw 9.5 and 5.3.

no dateopenyesnonoStatic reachability
CVE-2026-94127F5 BIG-IP APM
F5 BIG-IP APM

Exposure turns on the build and one configuration fact: an OAuth Authorization Server profile on a virtual server that an attacker can reach. Both can be read from the BIG-IP configuration. KEV tells you attacks occurred, but only the configuration read tells you whether this device can be hit.

D+0openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-76460Cisco Identity Services Engine
Cisco Identity Services Engine

Every unpatched ISE node is affected whatever its configuration, so the version only starts the question. What separates a node under attack from a node that is merely unpatched is whether anything hostile can open an HTTPS session to its management interface, and that depends on the firewall rules, infrastructure ACLs and segmentation in front of each node. Mapping the paths from user, guest and internet networks to each node settles that, and active exploitation makes it urgent.

D+0yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-81963Microsoft Windows Update Stack
Microsoft Windows Update Stack

Exposure needs an unpatched Windows 11 or Server 2025 build and an attacker who already runs code locally on that host. The build check settles the first. As a local escalation step, an attack-path view of how an attacker reaches local code settles real priority, and KEV shows it is already used.

D+0yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-85880Microsoft Windows ALPC
Microsoft Windows ALPC

Exposure needs two things: an unpatched build, and an attacker who already has code running in an AppContainer on that host. The build check settles the first. The second depends on which upstream flaw could put attacker code on the host, so an attack-path view settles real risk, and KEV shows the step is already used.

D+0yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-75650Adobe Commerce and Magento Open Source
Adobe Commerce and Magento Open Source

Attackers used this flaw three days before the hotfix existed, it needs no login, and Sansec shows a store with the July and August patches was hit. Known-exploited status means two actions on every internet-facing store: confirm the hotfix is applied, and investigate for compromise, because the hotfix closes the hole but does not clean a store that was already hit. The version number alone does not settle it, since the fix is a hotfix, not a release.

D-3yesyesnoyesKnown-exploited lists
CVE-2026-87491Google Chromium V8
Google Chromium V8

Exposure is per endpoint: the browser build, whether it was relaunched, and which other Chromium-based apps are installed. An agent or endpoint tool that reads those on each machine settles it, while network reachability tells you nothing because the attacker comes through the user's browser. KEV tells you to treat every unpatched endpoint as a target.

D+0openopenopenyesAgent investigation
CVE-2026-84869ConnectWise ScreenConnect
ConnectWise ScreenConnect

Exposure lives in the client on each endpoint, not the server, so the server version settles nothing. What decides it is each client's version together with which roles can transfer files and whether the session audit log shows a peer you do not recognize. That takes a client inventory plus an audit-log investigation.

D+7openopenopenyesAgent investigation
CVE-2026-82329JFrog Artifactory
JFrog Artifactory

The version and the default join-key configuration show whether the instance could be hit, but the fix does not evict an attacker who already minted tokens, created users or planted plugins. For an instance that was reachable while vulnerable the useful question is whether it was compromised, which needs log and file investigation against the join endpoint and plugins directory.

D+4openopenopenyesAgent investigation
CVE-2026-80521Linux kernel
Linux kernel

The version and distribution tables settle whether the kernel has the new collector. The open question is whether anyone can run code on the host as a local user, which an attack-path view answers from who and what can execute there. No exploitation is known, so a known-exploited feed has nothing to say yet.

no dateyesopennonoAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-75604Vercel Next.js
Vercel Next.js

Exposure needs facts that can be read from the deployment: an affected version, a Windows filesystem, a router setup without Cache Components and, for code execution, server actions that make the encryption key exist. A static inventory answers all four without exploitation data. The vendor gives no workaround and the fix is a version change, so the checks table settles it.

no dateopenyesnonoStatic reachability
CVE-2026-19490Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway
Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway

Exposure depends on the build and on whether the appliance runs a Gateway or AAA virtual server, plus a SAML action on newer builds. All of that is readable from the appliance with `show ns version` and a grep of the running configuration, so a configuration read settles it faster than a CVSS score or a feed. KEV confirms exploitation, which makes the check urgent but does not say whether your appliance is exposed.

D+21openyesnoyesStatic reachability
CVE-2026-64849MLflow Tracking Server
MLflow Tracking Server

A version below 3.15.0 is not enough: exposure needs the webhooks API open without authentication, a network path to the server and outbound reach to something worth stealing. Those are facts about the running server and its host, which the checks table reads one by one. KEV marks the CVE as exploited, so a reachable open server is urgent.

D+2openyesnoyesRuntime reachability
CVE-2026-42018JFrog Artifactory
JFrog Artifactory

On its own the bug yields only an anonymous-user token, so the version check shows it exists but not how much damage follows. Exposure becomes serious when the Access path is reachable and the same build is also open to CVE-2026-42016, which turns the token into an admin token. That is a question about the path an attacker can walk, so attack-path analysis fits.

D+3yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-65660Microsoft SharePoint Server
Microsoft SharePoint Server

A build check says whether the farm is patched, but exposure also depends on who can reach the server and whether any site allows anonymous viewing, which are facts about the running farm. The first row of the checks table settles the patch state and the second row settles who can reach the flaw. KEV and Microsoft confirm attacks, so a reachable unpatched farm is urgent.

D+44openyesnoyesRuntime reachability
CVE-2026-68820Microsoft Windows AFD for WinSock
Microsoft Windows AFD for WinSock

Exposure needs an unpatched build and an attacker who already runs code locally on that host. The build check settles the first. Because the flaw is local, an attack-path view of how an attacker gets local code on unpatched hosts decides real priority, and KEV shows it is already used.

D+0yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-41709Broadcom VMware ESX
Broadcom VMware ESX

The CVSS score of 2.7 and the high privilege requirement would put this at the back of a queue ordered by CVSS score, and the flaw leaves no log trail to search. The KEV listing and CISA's SSVC entry (exploitation: active) are the only evidence of use, so a known-exploited check is what raises it. The build number from esxcli system version get then tells you which hosts to patch.

D+91yesyesnoyesKnown-exploited lists
CVE-2026-42016JFrog Artifactory
JFrog Artifactory

The bug has two inputs: an affected build and a low-privileged token. The version call settles the first, but only the path from an untrusted network to a token source (the anonymous token of CVE-2026-42018, open anonymous access or a stolen user token) settles whether an attacker can reach the second, so attack-path analysis fits. Because the pair is known exploited, treat a vulnerable build with a reachable Access path as already compromised.

D+19yesopennoyesAttack-path analysis
CVE-2026-16723Alibaba fastjson 1.x
Alibaba fastjson 1.x

Every condition here is a fact in the build or the code: the fastjson version, fat-jar packaging, the SafeMode setting and a call path from untrusted input to the parser. Static reachability checks those without waiting for traffic. No one reports attacks yet, so a CVSS score alone would over- or under-state the risk for any one service.

no dateopenyesnonoStatic reachability
CVE-2026-59822BerriAI LiteLLM
BerriAI LiteLLM

Exposure turns on three facts that only the running proxy shows together: a version below 1.84.0, an MCP server with allow_all_keys: true, and an MCP route an outsider can reach. KEV and Wiz confirm real attacks, so treat a reachable proxy as urgent. The checks table settles it row by row.

D+50openyesnoyesRuntime reachability
CVE-2026-9198IBM Langflow OSS
IBM Langflow OSS

The default configuration of an affected version is vulnerable, so version alone does not decide exposure: the running instance must have auto-login on and be reachable by an outsider. Those are runtime facts, shown by the effective LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN value and the listening address. KEV and CISA's SSVC entry confirm active attacks.

D+15openyesnoyesRuntime reachability
CVE-2026-53266Linux kernel
Linux kernel

The flaw only runs when an ebtables nat rule with ARP rewrite exists on a bridge and a local user can reach it. The kernel version alone cannot show that, but reading the loaded modules and the ebtables rules on the running host can: that is runtime state, not source code. Known-exploited status says to act, and the rule check says where.

D+109openyesnoyesRuntime reachability
CVE-2026-46300Linux Kernel
Linux Kernel

Exposure needs a local foothold plus a kernel that can load the ESP code and lets the user create namespaces. Those are facts about the running host, so checking the kernel, the loaded modules and the namespace setting settles it, and a severity score or the version alone cannot. Known-exploited status tells you to act now, but not which hosts are reachable.

D+1openyesnoyesRuntime reachability
CVE-2026-34486Apache Software Foundation Apache Tomcat
Apache Software Foundation Apache Tomcat

Exposure needs three things at once: one of three exact Tomcat builds, an EncryptInterceptor in the cluster channel, and network reach to the receiver port. Inspecting the version, server.xml and listening sockets answers all three on a given node, so static reachability settles it. KEV and SOCRadar show real attacks, which raises the priority for any node that passes all three checks.

D+15openyesnoyesStatic reachability

Download: ledger.csv ledger.json, CC BY 4.0.

The Methods Matrix at a glance

A filled square means the method's proves text, as published on its page, speaks to the question; an empty one means it does not. An exploit-prediction score estimates how likely exploitation is across all deployments, so it speaks to the fourth question only in general, not for your environment.

Scroll the table sideways for more columns

Alphabetical by method name. Each mark is read from the method's proves text.
MethodCodeReachControlKnown
Agent investigationproves itproves itproves itno
Attack-path analysisnoproves itproves itno
EPSS exploit predictionnononoproves it
Known-exploited listsnononoproves it
Runtime reachability and live-state readsproves itnonono
Severity scoresnononono
Static reachability and configuration readsproves itnonono

How the method mapping works

The 81 answer combinations rule by rule, proves and misses for all seven methods, and what exploitable means in practice

How the answers map to a method

No standards body defines reachability analysis, so the primary source is vendor documentation. Snyk describes it as "identifying whether your application is calling a code element (for example, functions, classes, modules, and more) related to the vulnerability" (Snyk reachability analysis documentation, read 19 Nov 2026). That answers the code question only. It gives the wrong answer when the call graph is incomplete, because the same page states that a NO PATH FOUND status does not mean the vulnerability is completely unreachable. It also says nothing about a server compromised before it was patched, as with CVE-2026-82329.

The rules are read from the methods' own text and applied in order, and the first rule that matches applies. A "no" to reach, a "yes" to a control or a "no" to the code question rules exposure out, so the method is the one whose proves text produces that answer. Open questions go to the method that proves them; two or more open questions go to agent investigation, the one method whose proves text covers configuration, code, controls and network path. The fourth answer is read only when the finding is exposed, because known exploitation changes urgency, not exposure. The combinations column adds up to 81.

Three answers to four questions give 81 combinations; each one matches exactly one rule. Method text read 19 Nov 2026.
RuleWhen the answers areMethod that settles itCombinations of 81
Rule 1Can the service be reached: no. The other answers do not change the method.Attack-path analysis27
Rule 2Reached: yes or not sure, and a control is in front of it: yes.Agent investigation18
Rule 3Reached: yes or not sure, no control confirmed, and the code is called: no.Static reachability and configuration reads12
Rule 4Nothing above rules it out, and two or three of the first three answers are not sure.Agent investigation12
Rule 5Reached: yes, no control in front, and the code question is the only one not sure.Static reachability and configuration reads, or runtime reachability and live-state reads on a running workload3
Rule 6The code is called, and only the reach question or only the control question is not sure.Attack-path analysis6
Rule 7Called: yes, reached: yes, control: no, and exploitation known: yes or not sure.Known-exploited lists2
Rule 8Called: yes, reached: yes, control: no, and exploitation known: no.EPSS exploit prediction1

Sources

82 sources for the entries on this page
  1. Snyk reachability analysis documentation: definition of reachability analysis and the NO PATH FOUND limit, read 19 Nov 2026
  2. CVE-2026-123158: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  3. CVE-2026-123158: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 9 Nov 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  4. CVE-2026-123158: first exploitation, GreyNoise event page and timeline, read 19 Nov 2026
  5. CVE-2026-19868: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  6. CVE-2026-19868: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 6 Nov 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  7. CVE-2026-119977: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  8. CVE-2026-119977: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 3 Nov 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  9. CVE-2026-76418: NVD record; the first-exploitation date, 28 Oct 2026, comes from this record, read 19 Nov 2026
  10. CVE-2026-76418: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 29 Oct 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  11. CVE-2026-109618: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  12. CVE-2026-109618: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 26 Oct 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  13. CVE-2026-109618: first exploitation, Fastly report on PHP2Shell exploitation, disclosure timeline and indicators, read 19 Nov 2026
  14. CVE-2026-109619: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  15. CVE-2026-109619: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 26 Oct 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  16. CVE-2026-111497: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  17. CVE-2026-111497: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 27 Oct 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  18. CVE-2026-111497: first exploitation, ELLIO research on exploitation and affected builds, read 19 Nov 2026
  19. CVE-2026-102764: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  20. CVE-2026-102764: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 16 Oct 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  21. CVE-2026-102764: first exploitation, BeyondTrust blog on ARMORY CASTLE and BT26-05, read 19 Nov 2026
  22. CVE-2026-0322: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  23. CVE-2026-0322: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 14 Oct 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  24. CVE-2026-97229: NVD record; the first-exploitation date, 13 Oct 2026, comes from this record, read 19 Nov 2026
  25. CVE-2026-97229: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 29 Oct 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  26. CVE-2026-21589: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  27. CVE-2026-21589: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 15 Oct 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  28. CVE-2026-88779: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  29. CVE-2026-88779: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 4 Oct 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  30. CVE-2026-104286: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  31. CVE-2026-104286: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 1 Oct 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  32. CVE-2026-94545: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  33. CVE-2026-94127: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  34. CVE-2026-94127: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 22 Sep 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  35. CVE-2026-76460: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  36. CVE-2026-76460: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 16 Sep 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  37. CVE-2026-81963: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  38. CVE-2026-81963: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 8 Sep 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  39. CVE-2026-85880: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  40. CVE-2026-85880: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 8 Sep 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  41. CVE-2026-75650: NVD record carrying Adobe's advisory data for APSB26-146 (affected versions, hotfix, CVSS), read 19 Nov 2026
  42. CVE-2026-75650: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 8 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  43. CVE-2026-75650: first exploitation, Sansec research: StyleSmuggler 0-day (hotfix details, versions tested, indicators, timeline), read 19 Nov 2026
  44. CVE-2026-87491: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  45. CVE-2026-87491: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 9 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  46. CVE-2026-87491: first exploitation, Microsoft Edge security release notes, read 19 Nov 2026
  47. CVE-2026-84869: NVD record; the first-exploitation date, 10 Sep 2026, comes from this record, read 19 Nov 2026
  48. CVE-2026-84869: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 11 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  49. CVE-2026-82329: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  50. CVE-2026-82329: Wiz Research report, which confirmed successful exploitation between 1 and 8 Sep 2026, so servers were compromised before they were patched; also the first-exploitation source for CVE-2026-42018, 15 Aug 2026; also the first-exploitation source for CVE-2026-42016, 15 Aug 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  51. CVE-2026-82329: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 2 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  52. CVE-2026-82329: first exploitation, Fastly Security Research report, 3 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  53. CVE-2026-80521: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  54. CVE-2026-75604: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  55. CVE-2026-19490: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  56. CVE-2026-19490: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 9 Sep 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  57. CVE-2026-64849: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  58. CVE-2026-64849: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 19 Aug 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  59. CVE-2026-42018: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  60. CVE-2026-42018: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 11 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  61. CVE-2026-65660: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  62. CVE-2026-65660: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 25 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  63. CVE-2026-65660: first exploitation, Previdian research on exploitation attempts, read 19 Nov 2026
  64. CVE-2026-68820: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  65. CVE-2026-68820: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 11 Aug 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  66. CVE-2026-41709: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  67. CVE-2026-41709: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 28 Oct 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  68. CVE-2026-42016: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  69. CVE-2026-42016: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 11 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  70. CVE-2026-16723: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  71. CVE-2026-59822: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  72. CVE-2026-59822: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 2 Sep 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  73. CVE-2026-59822: first exploitation, Wiz Research honeypot report, read 19 Nov 2026
  74. CVE-2026-9198: NVD record; the first-exploitation date, 17 Jul 2026, comes from this record, read 19 Nov 2026
  75. CVE-2026-9198: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 4 Aug 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  76. CVE-2026-53266: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  77. CVE-2026-53266: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 18 Sep 2026; the first-exploitation date is this KEV date added, read 19 Nov 2026
  78. CVE-2026-46300: NVD record; the first-exploitation date, 14 May 2026, comes from this record, read 19 Nov 2026
  79. CVE-2026-46300: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 28 Oct 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  80. CVE-2026-34486: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  81. CVE-2026-34486: CISA KEV catalog entry, added 4 Aug 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
  82. CVE-2026-34486: first exploitation, SOCRadar research on the SNOWLIGHT campaign (exploitation and indicators), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.