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Reachability Analysis

CVE-2026-102764: BeyondTrust Remote Support, is it exploitable where you run it

Code called: openReached: yesControl in front: noExploitation known: yesWalk it through the four questions

What the flaw is

The flaw is in internal messaging components of Remote Support. They did not adequately check where a message came from (CWE-290, improper origin validation). Under the right conditions, an attacker can use this to perform file operations on the appliance.

Mandiant describes the result as unauthenticated remote file operations, including file upload, which can give host-level control and access to credentials the appliance stores. BeyondTrust has withheld technical details while self-hosted appliances are patched. The CNA rates it 9.3 on CVSS 4.0 (vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N); NVD adds a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8.

Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it

Condition for exposureHow to check it on your system
a self-hosted Remote Support appliance runs 26.2.3 or earlier without the BT26-05-RS patchBeyondTrust-hosted (SaaS) instances were patched by BeyondTrust and need no check; 26.3.1 and later include the fix. Sign in to the appliance administration interface at /appliance and read the installed version. Then look for BT26-05-RS among the applied updates, or confirm it was applied automatically if the appliance is subscribed to automatic updates. BeyondTrust publishes no build number for the patch, so presence in the applied list is the check. If the patch is not visible, open a BeyondTrust support case citing BT26-05. On a version older than 24.3.1 the patch does not apply: upgrade to a supported version first, then apply it. Self-hosted Privileged Remote Access shares the code: BeyondTrust found no exploit path there but released the patch as a precaution, so apply it too.
the appliance is reachable by the attacker over the network, with no credentials neededCheck your firewall, reverse proxy or WAF rules for the appliance's published address and ports. Reachability from the internet is the highest-risk case.

Affected and fixed versions

Source: BeyondTrust advisory BT26-05 (updated 4 Nov 2026) and the BeyondTrust blog.
Product lineAffectedFixed
Remote Support 24.3.1 to 26.2.3YesBT26-05-RS patch
Remote Support older than 24.3.1YesUpgrade to a newer version, then apply the patch
Remote Support 26.3.1 and greaterNoFixed in the release
Remote Support SaaSWas affectedPatched by BeyondTrust (released 8 Oct 2026; all SaaS instances confirmed patched as of 9 Oct 2026)
Privileged Remote AccessShares code; no exploit path foundPatch released as a precaution

If the fix cannot go in yet

  • Expose only the parts of the appliance users need and restrict /login and /appliance to trusted networks. Cost: remote users and customers outside those networks lose access to the restricted parts.
  • Allow outbound traffic from the appliance only to required destinations. Cost: new integrations need an explicit allow rule.
  • Forward appliance syslog and session events to a SIEM in near real time. Cost: SIEM setup; the actor deletes local logs, so off-box copies are often the only record.

What to look for

  • Files named by Mandiant: mangoapi.php (SAWFLY web shell) under the site service account's web root, /tmp/ingredi_ws (BARECLAW tunneler), /usr/bin/dbus-authd (unauthorized SUID-root binary), /home/bomgar/sbin/post_boot.d/zz-root-persist (persistence script), and a staging file named app_84304470.php.
  • Config changes: unexpected NOPASSWD entries in /ns/config/sudoers.template, and an unfamiliar ACL (wswsws) and backend (webskd3) in /ns/config/haproxy.conf.
  • Network: POST requests to a request path containing app_84304470, a WebSocket path /uidchanarge, a local listener on TCP 19800, and unknown .php request paths at the proxy or WAF.
  • Deleted or missing logs: /ns/log/auth.log, /ns/log/ssl.log, /ns/log/http-access.log, /var/log/messages, /home/bomgar/log/bt-secrets.log. Gaps in syslog forwarding that start and end within one session are a strong sign of tampering.
  • Syslog events: user_changed entries that raise jump_item_role or team roles from No Access to Administrator, and login success events on web/login from residential or commercial VPN addresses you cannot tie to an administrator or ticket.
  • Hashes and rules in the Mandiant post (IOC table and Detections section): SHA-256 dc14e215269a93fdbc4c1a80b984c23faf7af0911c6dbb85309796a6f2ae95fb for mangoapi.php (SAWFLY) and 1f19b9a27d79c11bda00a1e8faf74a7fdd683d38ccef1b60df2fd0307e3aa462 for ingredi_ws (BARECLAW); YARA rules G_Hunting_Webshell_SAWFLY_1 and G_Hunting_Backdoor_BARECLAW_1. The staging file app_84304470.php has no published hash. BeyondTrust offers a threat hunting package through its trust portal. The actor rotates infrastructure per victim, so hunt for behavior as well as indicators. No IP indicators were published.

Exploited 47 days before disclosure: disclosed 15 Oct 2026, first exploitation reported 29 Aug 2026.

Exploitation reported so far

BeyondTrust and Mandiant attribute the zero-day exploitation to a suspected China-nexus espionage actor that Mandiant calls ARMORY CASTLE (formerly UNC5221). BeyondTrust knows of two affected customers, one hosted and one self-hosted, and says it has seen no evidence of adversary activity since August.

Mandiant expects broad exploitation of unpatched appliances now that the flaw is public, as the actor has done with past edge-device flaws. CISA marks ransomware use as Unknown.

Response when an unpatched, internet-reachable appliance may be compromised (Mandiant): preserve evidence first by snapshotting virtual appliances with memory and collecting external syslog, proxy and firewall logs. Rebuild from a clean patched image rather than cleaning in place. Then rotate every credential the appliance stored or injected, in this order: /appliance admin, /login users, API client secrets, SAML and security provider keys, vault credentials, integration credentials. Review new MFA registrations on privileged accounts and open a Sev 1 case citing BT26-05.

Why static reachability settles it

Exposure depends on two facts you can read: the installed Remote Support version and whether the BT26-05 patch is applied, plus whether the appliance is reachable. Because exploitation preceded the patch, an exposed unpatched appliance also needs a compromise check using the detection list. See static reachability for what the method proves and misses.

Sources

  1. CVE-2026-102764: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
  2. CVE-2026-102764: CISA KEV entry (KEV feed 2026.11.18), read 19 Nov 2026
  3. CVE-2026-102764: vendor advisory BT26-05, read 19 Nov 2026
  4. CVE-2026-102764: BeyondTrust blog on ARMORY CASTLE and BT26-05, read 19 Nov 2026
  5. CVE-2026-102764: Mandiant and GTIG analysis, read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.