CVE-2026-42016: JFrog Artifactory, is it exploitable where you run it
Code called: yesReached: openControl in front: noExploitation known: yesWalk it through the four questions
What the flaw is
Artifactory's Access service issues and accepts tokens. When a caller presents a token, Artifactory confirms that the signature and the issuer are valid, but it does not enforce the scope the token was meant to carry. JFrog classes this as incorrect authorization (CWE-863).
An attacker who holds any valid low-privileged token can ask the token endpoint for a new token with administrator authority. The new token keeps the original username but carries admin rights. The attacker then controls users, repositories, configuration and stored credentials. NVD rates it 8.8 (CVSS base score; network, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction).
On its own the bug needs a low-privileged token. CVE-2026-42018 can supply one without any login, which is how attackers used the pair in the wild.
Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it
| Condition for exposure | How to check it on your system |
|---|---|
| the instance is self-hosted Artifactory on a build below 7.133.11, or on the 7.111, 7.117 or 7.125 train below the target build in the versions table (JFrog Cloud was fixed by JFrog) | Run GET /artifactory/api/system/version and read the version field; JFrog documents this call. Below 7.133.11 is affected. On the 7.111, 7.117 and 7.125 trains JFrog lists no fixed build for this CVE, so use the target build for the train in the versions table. Self-hosted means you run the Artifactory service yourself (the artifactory service under systemctl, or the container or Helm release). |
| a low-privileged token can be obtained and the Access token endpoint is reachable from the attacker's network position | Any valid user token qualifies. Check whether anonymous access is enabled (Administration, Security, General), and whether the instance is also open to CVE-2026-42018, which returns an anonymous token even with anonymous access disabled (it has its own ledger entry). From a host where an attacker could sit, confirm the paths under /access/api/v1/ answer through your reverse proxy or load balancer. Wiz saw the exploit use POST /access/api/v1/tokens. |
Affected and fixed versions
Scroll the table sideways for more columns
| Release train | Affected (JFrog and NVD) | Minimum JFrog lists | Target build for the chain |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.111.x | Below 7.133.11, so all builds | None listed | 7.111.21 |
| 7.117.x | Below 7.133.11, so all builds | None listed | 7.117.28 |
| 7.125.x | Below 7.133.11, so all builds | None listed | 7.125.20 |
| 7.133.x | 7.133.0 to 7.133.10 | 7.133.11 | 7.133.29 |
| 7.146.x | Not affected (above the bound) | Not applicable | 7.146.38 |
| 7.161.x | Not affected (above the bound) | Not applicable | 7.161.20 |
If the fix cannot go in yet
- Upgrade to the target build for your train in the versions table (7.133.11 is the lowest build JFrog lists). JFrog gives no workaround for this CVE, so the upgrade is the fix. Cost: a restart of the service and the usual upgrade testing.
- Limit the Access paths and the Artifactory UI to trusted networks (Wiz). Cost: remote developers, CI systems and external consumers lose access unless they come through the allowed path.
- Treat the instance as compromised if it was exposed while vulnerable (Wiz): an upgrade does not remove admin users, Groovy plugins or stolen Access signing keys. Review admin users and the plugins directory, and reset the Access token certificate if you find signs of entry. Cost: a reset invalidates tokens and needs a planned window.
What to look for
- Look for a low-privilege identity or the internal anonymous identity minting tokens at POST /access/api/v1/tokens or POST /artifactory/api/security/token (Wiz).
- Sample query for admin actions by the escalated anonymous token. After a successful exchange the token keeps the anonymous username but carries admin authority, so later requests show an actor of token:anonymous. In the request log (artifactory-request.log under $JFROG_HOME/artifactory/var/log/, pipe-separated fields) run: grep -F 'token:anonymous' artifactory-request.log* | grep -E '|(PUT|POST|DELETE|PATCH)|' | grep -E '/api/security/(users|token)|/access/api/(v1/tokens|ui/users)|/api/plugins'. Any hit with a 200 or 201 status is a candidate; adjust the field match if your log layout differs.
- Look for a low-privilege identity listing users at GET /access/api/v1/users or GET /artifactory/api/security/users/
, and any low-privilege identity reading or writing /artifactory/api/plugins (Wiz). - Persistence to look for: new admin accounts created by PUT /api/security/users/
or /access/api/ui/users/ (Wiz saw names such as jfrog-distribution, jfrog-insight, repo-service, backup-service, migration-tool, ldap_admin and 0xterror), and Groovy files under $JFROG_HOME/var/etc/artifactory/plugins/. Wiz recovered plugins named rce.groovy, cmd.groovy, jwtToken.groovy, uploadFile.groovy, JFrogImage.groovy, metrics.groovy and httpSession.groovy. - Post-exploitation indicators Wiz saw with the chain: payload downloads from hxxp://log.gitclone[.]org:45678/smtp and hxxp://3.88.162[.]79:36789/smtp, C2 64.207.232[.]6:8443, payload SHA1 513a907b69edffc3cb77a494da395178d21ef9bd (file /tmp/.z), and actor IPs 149.102.229[.]150 and 121.123.141[.]155.
Exploited 19 days after disclosure: disclosed 27 Jul 2026, first exploitation reported 15 Aug 2026.
Exploitation reported so far
Wiz Research says attackers chained CVE-2026-42018 and CVE-2026-42016 against self-hosted Artifactory between 15 Aug and 8 Sep 2026, and knew of no earlier public report. Several actors were involved, and some went from the first request to a new admin account in under five minutes. Follow-on activity included persistent admin accounts, Groovy plugins, shell commands, and a custom Rust backdoor dropped under /tmp or /dev/shm style paths.
Wiz measured that 59% of organizations running Artifactory still had a vulnerable instance for this CVE six weeks after it was first published on 27 Jul 2026, down from 67% at publication. Its figure for CVE-2026-42018 (62% four weeks after its 12 Aug 2026 publication) is a different CVE measured from a different date.
Why attack-path analysis settles it
The bug has two inputs: an affected build and a low-privileged token. The version call settles the first, but only the path from an untrusted network to a token source (the anonymous token of CVE-2026-42018, open anonymous access or a stolen user token) settles whether an attacker can reach the second, so attack-path analysis fits. Because the pair is known exploited, treat a vulnerable build with a reachable Access path as already compromised.
Related pages
Sources
- CVE-2026-42016: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-42016: CISA KEV entry (feed version 2026.11.18), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-42016: JFrog security advisories (vendor advisory, CVE-2026-42016 section), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-42016: Wiz Research report, 10 Sep 2026, updated 17 Sep 2026 (the URL as Wiz publishes it, which NVD lists too), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-42016: JFrog documentation: Get Artifactory Version API, read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.