CVE-2026-75604: Vercel Next.js, is it exploitable where you run it
Code called: openReached: yesControl in front: noExploitation known: noWalk it through the four questions
What the flaw is
Next.js builds file paths for its incremental cache from the route segments of a request. On servers that use a Windows filesystem, it does not consistently escape backslashes in those segments. A request that carries encoded Windows path separators can therefore step outside the cache directory and read files that should stay private.
The files at risk include private build data. NVD names the server-reference-manifest encryption key. The vendor rates the result as unauthenticated remote code execution: with that key an attacker can act against the application's server actions. The CVSS vector sets attack complexity to High, and the scope as changed.
The flaw sits in the shared path-escaping helper (escape-path-delimiters.ts) and the file-system cache (file-system-cache.ts). The cache joins the request's route segments onto three roots: .next/server/pages for the Pages Router, .next/server/app for App Router pages and routes, and .next/cache/fetch-cache for fetch data. A segment that carries an encoded Windows separator can climb out of those roots, so the files reachable are files under the application's build output, for example server-reference-manifest.json with its encryption key. The fix escapes backslashes in segments and rejects any resolved cache path outside its root (error text "Invalid file path"). It applies to the Pages Router and to the App Router when Cache Components is not in use. Linux and macOS hosts are not named as affected.
Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it
| Condition for exposure | How to check it on your system |
|---|---|
| next is 13.4.0 to before 15.5.24, or 16.0.0 to before 16.3.3 | In the project folder run npm ls next (or pnpm why next, yarn why next). For a deployed bundle run node -p "require('next/package.json').version" from the app directory on the server. Compare with the versions table; 13.x and 14.x have no patch, so move to 15.5.24 or later. Check every deployed copy, not only the repository, because a lockfile can differ from what is running. |
| a Windows server answers unauthenticated requests for a Pages Router or non-Cache-Components App Router app | The flaw affects an app that uses the Pages Router or the App Router without Cache Components. Look for a pages or src/pages folder (Pages Router) and an app or src/app folder (App Router) in the project. For Cache Components, open next.config.js or next.config.ts and look for the cacheComponents setting. An App Router app with that setting on is outside the affected configuration the vendor lists; an app without it is inside. Windows: On the host run node -p process.platform: the value win32 means Windows. In PowerShell (Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem).Caption names the edition. For a container run docker inspect --format '{{.Os}}' <container>: windows means a Windows container. A Linux container on a Windows laptop uses a Linux filesystem and is outside the condition the vendor describes. Reach (CVSS: network, no privileges, no user interaction): find which addresses and ports the Next.js server listens on (netstat -ano | findstr LISTENING on Windows) and whether the firewall, load balancer or reverse proxy publishes them. An internal-only service still counts for anyone who can reach it. |
| for code execution, the app uses server actions, so the leaked server-reference-manifest encryption key is usable (NVD: disclosure of that key can enable remote code execution) | Search the source for the "use server" directive. The fix's own test notes that a server action makes next build emit server-reference-manifest.json, the file that holds the encryption key. An application with no server actions emits no such manifest, so there is no key to leak, but other private build JSON under the .next output remains readable. The vendor still rates the CVE as remote code execution. |
Affected and fixed versions
| Release line | Affected versions | First fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Next.js 13.4 and later 13.x, and 14.x | All, from 13.4.0 | None for these lines: upgrade to 15.5.24 or later |
| Next.js 15.x | 15.0.0 up to but excluding 15.5.24 | 15.5.24 |
| Next.js 16.x | 16.0.0 up to but excluding 16.3.3 | 16.3.3 |
If the fix cannot go in yet
- Upgrade to Next.js 15.5.24 or 16.3.3, then rebuild and redeploy; 13.4.x and 14.x apps must move to 15.5.24 or later. This is the only fix. Cost: a rebuild and a redeploy, plus regression testing for a version bump.
- The vendor states there is no known workaround for affected Windows-hosted applications and says to upgrade immediately if the server is hosted on Windows.
- Until the upgrade ships, reduce exposure by keeping affected Windows-hosted instances off the internet (allow only trusted networks at the firewall or reverse proxy). Cost: users outside those networks lose access. This step is our guidance, not the vendor's.
What to look for
- No indicators of compromise or log strings were published by the vendor, NVD or CISA, and CISA's SSVC data in NVD records exploitation as none. The patch shows what the abuse looks like in a web or reverse proxy access log (derived from the fix, not vendor guidance): requests to page routes or /_next/data/ paths that contain an encoded backslash (%5c or %5C) in a route segment. A search that matches that shape is the regular expression
/_next/data/[^ ]*%5[cC]or, for page routes,GET /[^ ]*%5[cC]. Ordinary routes carry none, so any hit on a Windows-hosted instance is worth review; the status code alone does not show whether a file was read, so check what the response returned. - If an affected Windows-hosted instance was reachable from untrusted networks, treat build secrets, including the server-reference-manifest encryption key, as exposed and rotate them by rebuilding after the upgrade. This is our guidance, not the vendor's.
No public report dates the start of exploitation.
Why static reachability settles it
Exposure needs facts that can be read from the deployment: an affected version, a Windows filesystem, a router setup without Cache Components and, for code execution, server actions that make the encryption key exist. A static inventory answers all four without exploitation data. The vendor gives no workaround and the fix is a version change, so the checks table settles it. See static reachability for what the method proves and misses.
Related pages
Sources
- CVE-2026-75604: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-75604: vendor advisory (Next.js GHSA-p293-qw3h-jr36, via the GitHub advisory API), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-75604: GitHub advisory API record for the Next.js advisory, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-75604: Next.js 15.5.24 release notes, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-75604: Next.js 16.3.3 release notes, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-75604: vendor fix commit for the 16.3 line, read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.