CVE-2026-75650: Adobe Commerce and Magento Open Source, is it exploitable where you run it
Code called: yesReached: yesControl in front: noExploitation known: yesWalk it through the four questions
What the flaw is
Adobe Commerce and Magento fill email and page templates by replacing directives such as variable and block tags. A flaw in how the template engine handles nested directives lets an unauthenticated visitor smuggle a directive through guest cart address fields. Before the patch, a smuggled block directive created any PHP class, not only block classes. That gives the attacker arbitrary object creation, and from there code execution as the web user (CWE-1336, template engine injection). No user interaction is needed and the scope is changed, so Adobe rates it 10.0 (CVSS 3.1 base score).
Sansec and Fastly describe an attack in stages: first get attacker-controlled PHP text onto the disk, for example through a log or error report that stores a request unescaped, then trigger the template flaw through Magento's standard failed payment email (the 'Payment Transaction Failed Reminder' template, present in a standard install) so that a gadget includes that file. Sansec says the attack can also succeed when email delivery fails, so turning off outbound mail is no fix, and that more than one way to write the text exists, so closing one write path does not stop it.
Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it
| Condition for exposure | How to check it on your system |
|---|---|
| the store runs Adobe Commerce, B2B or Magento Open Source through 2026-aug | Affected: Adobe Commerce 2.4.4 to 2.4.9, Commerce B2B 1.3.3 to 1.5.3, or Magento Open Source 2.4.6 to 2.4.9 (Sansec also reports Open Source 2.4.4 and 2.4.5) at any patch level through the 2026-aug releases, or an older branch that has no Adobe fix. On the server run bin/magento --version. Or run composer show magento/product-community-edition (Open Source) or composer show magento/product-enterprise-edition (Commerce), and composer show magento/extension-b2b for B2B. The admin footer also shows the version. Adobe's record lists Open Source 2.4.6 to 2.4.9; Sansec says the hotfix was tested on Open Source 2.4.4 to 2.4.9 and that those releases are exposed, so treat 2.4.4 and 2.4.5 as affected. Branches before 2.4.4 are affected and get no Adobe fix. |
| Hotfix VULN-39341 is not installed | From the Magento root run vendor/bin/magento-patches -n status | grep "39341|Status". Sansec gives this command from Adobe's bulletin; the line for 39341 must show Applied. Any other result, or no line for 39341, means the store is unpatched. |
| The storefront is reachable by unauthenticated visitors from the internet, including guest cart and GraphQL endpoints | From a host outside your network run curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"{ __typename }"}' https://shop.example/graphql. A 200 means the GraphQL endpoint answers without login. Also confirm guest checkout is enabled in the admin under Stores > Configuration > Sales > Checkout > Checkout Options > Allow Guest Checkout. |
| The web user can write to places Magento later includes (var/log, var/report, pub/media) | Run sudo -u |
Affected and fixed versions
| Product line | Affected | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Adobe Commerce 2.4.9, 2.4.8, 2.4.7, 2.4.6, 2.4.5, 2.4.4 | All releases and patch levels through 2.4.x-2026-aug | Hotfix VULN-39341 (composer patch) |
| Adobe Commerce B2B 1.5.3, 1.5.2, 1.4.2, 1.3.4, 1.3.3 | All releases and patch levels through 1.x.y-2026-aug | Hotfix VULN-39341 (composer patch) |
| Magento Open Source 2.4.9, 2.4.8, 2.4.7, 2.4.6 | All releases and patch levels through 2.4.x-2026-aug (Adobe's record lists 2.4.6 to 2.4.9; Sansec says 2.4.5 and 2.4.4 are affected and tested the hotfix there) | Hotfix VULN-39341 (composer patch) |
| Branches 2.2, 2.3, 2.4.0 to 2.4.3 (end of support) | Affected | No Adobe fix. Scandiweb published backports for 41 older releases, 2.2.0 to 2.4.3-p3 (third-party patches, test on staging first) |
If the fix cannot go in yet
- Apply Adobe's hotfix VULN-39341 (APSB26-146): download VULN-39341-composer-patches.zip from repo.magento.com and apply it as a composer patch, then run the status command from the checks table; the line for 39341 must show Applied. Cost: a composer patch run and a deploy window; no new release number is involved.
- Compensating control: a WAF rule. Fastly offers a virtual patch for its Next-Gen WAF covering each stage, and Sansec Shield blocks the variants it has seen. Both vendors say to install the Adobe patch anyway, since operators changed payloads several times a day from 4 Sep. Cost: possible false positives on admin template updates.
- Moving sessions to Redis or the database does not stop the attack (Sansec). Disabling mail does not stop it either.
- Unsupported branches (2.2, 2.3, 2.4.0 to 2.4.3) get no Adobe patch. Upgrade to a supported release. Scandiweb publishes third-party backports for older releases; test them on a staging copy first.
- CISA's KEV entry gives the required action: apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, follow CISA's Forensics Triage Requirements, and discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. The entry also points to the BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.
What to look for
- Host evidence (Sansec). A strong sign is a background process disguised as [kworker/u:8:0], fc-cache or chronyd, run by the web user. Run crontab -l | grep -i gvfsd; ls -la ~/.local/share/.gvfsd/ ~/.cache/fontconfig/fc-cache /tmp/.kw_* /tmp/.cache_* /tmp/.gvfsd-* /tmp/.fc-/fc-cache /tmp/fc-cache /tmp/.chrony-/chronyd 2>/dev/null; ps -eo pid,comm,args | grep -iE 'kworker|fc-cache|chronyd'. A chronyd or fc-cache process whose parent is PID 1, or a cron line such as 13,43 * * * * for fc-cache, is suspect. An empty crontab is not proof of a clean host, because one build can relaunch with no cron entry. Check the cron spool file itself, not only crontab -l.
- Logs and files (Sansec): grep -r 'crontab command not allowed' /var/log/ ; grep -ril 'x_trace_' var/report/ ; find -L pub/media -type f -name '*.php'. A PHP file under pub/media/catalog/product/cache/ss_<10 hex>/ named sync_<10 hex>.php is a web shell. A modified vendor/magento/framework/App/View.php that loads remote code is another sign. Bursts of failed payment emails in the mail log deserve a look; ordinary declined payments send the same message.
- Network indicators (Sansec, defanged): C2 99[.]84[.]67[.]186:443 (WebSocket over TLS); NTP-shaped UDP port 123 beacons to ntp[.]timesync[.]to and ntp[.]timesysnc[.]net, both resolving to 185[.]157[.]160[.]251 on 7 Sep 2026, with fallbacks ntp[.]synctime[.]to and ntp[.]syncstime[.]to; malware download host 209[.]141[.]43[.]95; second toolkit C2 213[.]111[.]146[.]27 on ports 80, 443 and 8443. A real NTP client sends one datagram per poll; the implant sends nine 48-byte datagrams about 10 ms apart every 60 seconds.
- Attacker source addresses Sansec lists: 88[.]216[.]72[.]181, 88[.]216[.]72[.]182, 182[.]182[.]152[.]48, 76[.]31[.]99[.]207, 209[.]73[.]130[.]148, 77[.]239[.]124[.]107, 98[.]224[.]189[.]28. SHA-256 of the fc-cache family and other samples are in Sansec's article. Scan with Sansec eComscan. If a suspicious process turned up, rotate Magento credentials. Patching closes the hole but does not clean a store that was already hit.
- After exposure (Adobe recommendation, per Sansec): rotate the encryption key and every credential it protected: admin passwords, REST, SOAP and GraphQL integration tokens, OAuth client secrets, payment gateway API credentials, database credentials, SSH and deploy keys, and third-party extension API keys. Rotate at the source, not only in Magento, because rotating the encryption key alone does not invalidate anything an attacker already read. Cost: every integration needs a new credential. Rotation does not replace the hotfix.
Exploited 3 days before disclosure: disclosed 7 Sep 2026, first exploitation reported 4 Sep 2026.
Exploitation reported so far
Sansec reproduced the chain on clean Magento Open Source 2.4.7, 2.4.8 and 2.4.9. Two operators were seen: one that installs a Rust backdoor with NTP-shaped command traffic, and a second that drops a web shell in the product image cache. A later store compromise used gs-netcat and the WraithC2 remote access tool. Sansec says it has no sign the backdoor was weaponized further.
Why known-exploited lists settle it
Attackers used this flaw three days before the hotfix existed, it needs no login, and Sansec shows a store with the July and August patches was hit. Known-exploited status means two actions on every internet-facing store: confirm the hotfix is applied, and investigate for compromise, because the hotfix closes the hole but does not clean a store that was already hit. The version number alone does not settle it, since the fix is a hotfix, not a release. See known-exploited lists for what the method proves and misses.
Related pages
Sources
- CVE-2026-75650: NVD record carrying Adobe's advisory data for APSB26-146 (affected versions, hotfix, CVSS), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-75650: CISA KEV entry (feed version 2026.11.18), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-75650: Sansec research: StyleSmuggler 0-day (hotfix details, versions tested, indicators, timeline), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-75650: Fastly report: What is Style Smuggler (16 Sep 2026), read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.