CVE-2026-109619: PHP Group PHP, is it exploitable where you run it
Code called: yesReached: openControl in front: noExploitation known: yesWalk it through the four questions
What the flaw is
A PHP worker keeps global state, such as error, session, object and extension state, that points into memory owned by one request. That state must be reset before the request memory is freed. In some paths it is not reset, or it is filled in again after the reset. The request heap is then freed while the worker still refers to it. A later request handled by the same worker can read, free or branch on that stale state before PHP has initialized the new request, which is a use after free (CWE-416). A prepared heap layout can turn this into remote code execution.
Exploitation needs two parts. A producer is a PHP operation in one request that leaves request-owned state published, such as a fatal error, uncaught error, failed require, Maximum execution time exceeded, or out-of-memory failure. A consumer is an operation in a later request that runs before normal initialization and acts on the stale state. PHP confirms two consumers: an INI warning or deprecation raised during request startup, and session upload progress handling. In the demonstrated attacks the two parts are in different HTTP requests on the same worker. The confirmed remote code execution was shown on Apache mod_php, using the PHP 8.5 fatal error backtrace producer. The session upload progress path was validated separately on PHP-FPM. The minimum set for exposure is an affected build, a worker an unauthenticated client can reach, one producer and one consumer. Session upload progress is on by default, so on a default configuration the consumer is already present and only a producer is needed.
Ratings: NVD's primary CVSS 3.1 base score is 8.1 (attack complexity High). PHP's CVSS 4.0 base score in NVD is 9.2. PHP says exact affected versions, configuration and mitigations depend on which internal state is involved, and that no configuration setting covers every case.
Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it
| Condition for exposure | How to check it on your system |
|---|---|
| the PHP build serving web requests is below 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27 or 8.5.12 | Run php-fpm -v, php-cgi -v, or the mod_php build's php -v (confirm mod_php with apachectl -M | grep -i php). For packages: rpm -q php or dpkg -l 'php*', then rpm -q --changelog php | grep -i 109619 or apt changelog php8.3 | grep -i 109619, since distributions backport fixes without changing the version. |
| an unauthenticated client can reach a PHP worker and trigger a producer event | Run ps -ef | grep -Ei 'php-fpm|frankenphp|lsphp|httpd|apache2' and apachectl -M | grep -i php. Check pm.max_requests in the pool files (grep -R pm.max_requests /etc/php* /etc/php-fpm.d): a low value shortens how long stale state can live but does not remove the flaw. From outside your network, confirm that PHP entry points answer without login. Review which routes, content types, uploads and plugin options can raise a fatal error or time out. PHP says to include upload, import, error page, shutdown, destructor, serialization and output handler paths, not only ordinary page requests. |
| session upload progress is on (the default), which supplies a consumer | Read the value the web SAPI uses: run php-fpm -i | grep session.upload_progress.enabled for PHP-FPM or php-cgi -i for CGI, and for mod_php read phpinfo() output served through Apache. The CLI's php -i reads the CLI configuration and can differ, so it does not answer this check. Then run grep -Rn upload_progress /etc/php* /etc/php-fpm.d /etc/apache2 /etc/httpd. A value of 1 or On means the consumer is present. |
| on PHP 8.5, fatal_error_backtraces is enabled, the strongest confirmed producer | Read the web SAPI value, not the CLI's: php-fpm -i | grep fatal_error_backtraces for PHP-FPM, or phpinfo() output served through Apache for mod_php, plus grep -Rn fatal_error_backtraces /etc/php* /etc/php-fpm.d /etc/apache2 /etc/httpd. Only PHP 8.5 applies. |
| INI values that raise a warning or deprecation at request startup, which supply a consumer | Audit startup configuration, then run the logging audit described under What to look for. PHP lists likely sources: auto_detect_line_endings=1, a non-default filter.default, legacy assert.* settings on 8.3 and later, legacy session settings on 8.4 and later, report_memleaks=0 or a nonzero intl.error_level on 8.5, configured mbstring or iconv encodings, invalid or conflicting zend.assertions, memory_limit and date.timezone values, and log, mail, session or SOAP cache paths rejected by open_basedir. Also check Apache php_value / php_flag / php_admin_* lines and .htaccess files, and PHP_VALUE parameters sent by nginx or mod_proxy_fcgi. Pool values and .user.ini are applied at worker start or after initialization and are not early consumers. |
Affected and fixed versions
| PHP branch | Affected | First fixed release |
|---|---|---|
| PHP 8.5 | Earlier than 8.5.12 | 8.5.12 |
| PHP 8.4 | Earlier than 8.4.27 | 8.4.27 |
| PHP 8.3 | Earlier than 8.3.36 | 8.3.36 |
| PHP 8.2 | Earlier than 8.2.35 | 8.2.35 |
| PHP 8.1 and older | Unsupported branches; PHP publishes no fix | None upstream |
If the fix cannot go in yet
- Upgrade to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35, or to your distribution's patched package. PHP says only a release with the complete state-reset patch is reliable, because no generic configuration setting covers every producer and consumer. Cost: a PHP restart and regression testing.
- PHP 8.5 only: set fatal_error_backtraces=0 administratively and restart every worker. This removes the producer used by the confirmed RCE case. Cost: fatal error messages no longer carry backtraces, which makes debugging harder. It does not cover other request-owned state.
- Set session.upload_progress.enabled=0 administratively and restart every worker. This stops the demonstrated early session producing and consuming operations. Cost: upload progress tracking stops working for any application that uses it. PHP suggests keeping it off after patching if you do not need it. It does not cover the other lifecycle paths.
- Remove deprecated and invalid INI directives so no diagnostics fire during request initialization. Prefer php.ini, FPM pool or server configuration applied at startup over per-request overrides (Apache php_value, .htaccess, frontend PHP_VALUE). Changing error_reporting, using @, or turning off display_errors or log_errors does not help. Cost: configuration cleanup time.
- If performance does not matter, set pm.max_requests=1 so each worker handles one request. Cost: every request pays worker startup time, and throughput drops sharply. Separately, stop attacker-controlled requests from reaching Maximum execution time exceeded inside an affected operation; changing the time limit only removes that one interruption.
- Also apply the mitigations for CVE-2026-109618, since PHP says to follow the remediation advice from the related report. Both are in the same patch release. CISA's guidance for systems that cannot be patched is to take them offline.
What to look for
- PHP's logging audit: with log_errors=On, a functional error_log and error_reporting=E_ALL set in startup configuration, review Apache, PHP-FPM, reverse proxy and service logs for warnings, deprecations and core errors repeated before target scripts run; warnings produced during extension or server cleanup; fatal, parse and uncaught error messages; the string Maximum execution time exceeded; and failures tied to routes, content types, files, callbacks or plugin options an attacker controls.
- PHP warns that a clean log is not proof of safety: historical logs may exclude deprecations, an E_ALL audit covers only the routes exercised, and a failure may happen before logging is set up.
- Host evidence of compromise (CISA, Fastly): PHP worker processes launching shells or downloading tools, worker crashes in the Apache error log such as AH00051 'child pid ... exit signal', and unexpected outbound connections from PHP workers.
- Fastly's PHP2Shell-named tooling covered both CVEs and was not split by CVE, so the network indicators in the CVE-2026-109618 entry (boundary B7kQpoc618 with User-Agent php2shell-109618) are the most specific published signature for both. CISA published a SIGMA rule in its alert.
The earliest dated mark of exploitation is CISA's, on 26 Oct 2026, 5 days after disclosure; exploitation may have begun earlier.
Exploitation reported so far
PHP says the strongest demonstrated case is a PHP 8.5 fatal error backtrace producer with a consumer on a later request. Success cannot be told from failure at the network edge, so confirmation is on the origin host.
This entry dates exploitation to CISA's KEV listing on 26 Oct 2026, 5 days after disclosure, because that is the earliest mark specific to this CVE. Fastly's 21 Oct 2026 traffic came from PHP2Shell-named tools that covered this CVE and CVE-2026-109618 together, and Fastly does not split its counts by CVE, so that date cannot be assigned to this CVE alone.
Why attack-path analysis settles it
Exploitation needs a producer event in one request and a consumer in a later request on the same worker. Whether both exist depends on the PHP branch, the SAPI, the INI settings and the application's error paths, so tracing that path on each deployment settles exposure. Where the build is fixed, the path no longer matters.
Related pages
Sources
- CVE-2026-109619: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-109619: CISA KEV entry (feed version 2026.11.18), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-109619: vendor advisory (PHP GitHub security advisory GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-109619: Fastly report on PHP2Shell exploitation, disclosure timeline and indicators, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-109619: CISA alert: Critical Vulnerabilities in PHP Require Immediate Patching, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-109619: vendor advisory for the sibling CVE-2026-109618 (GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w), read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.