CVE-2026-42018: JFrog Artifactory, is it exploitable where you run it
Code called: yesReached: openControl in front: noExploitation known: yesWalk it through the four questions
What the flaw is
Artifactory's Access service has an internal anonymous user. A request to one variant of the AWS token path made without credentials could return a token for that user, even on instances where anonymous access is switched off. JFrog classes it as improper authentication (CWE-287).
The token only carries the rights of the anonymous user, which is why the CVSS base score is 7.5 (set by JFrog) with confidentiality impact only. It can still expose artifacts and repository data that the anonymous identity can read.
Its main danger is as step one of a chain. A low-privileged token is exactly what CVE-2026-42016 needs to produce an administrator token. Together the two turn an unauthenticated request into admin control.
Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it
| Condition for exposure | How to check it on your system |
|---|---|
| the instance is self-hosted Artifactory below the fixed build for its train (7.111.20, 7.117.27, 7.125.19, 7.133.28 or 7.146.8) | JFrog Cloud was fixed by JFrog, and 7.161.x is not listed as affected. Run GET /artifactory/api/system/version against the instance (a valid user is enough, anonymous works if enabled) and read the version field; the UI shows it in the footer or About page. A version below the build for its train in the versions table is affected. Self-hosted means you run the service or container yourself. |
| the Access service is reachable by the attacker, whatever the anonymous access setting | Confirm /access/api/v1/ paths answer through your reverse proxy or load balancer from an untrusted network. Wiz saw the exploit use a POST to /access/api/v1/aws/token/ with a trailing slash. The flaw applies even with anonymous access disabled (Administration, Security, General), so turning it off does not clear you. |
Affected and fixed versions
| Release train | Affected | First fixed |
|---|---|---|
| 7.111.x and earlier | Below 7.111.20 | 7.111.20 |
| 7.117.x | 7.117.0 to below 7.117.27 | 7.117.27 |
| 7.125.x | 7.125.0 to below 7.125.19 | 7.125.19 |
| 7.133.x | 7.133.0 to below 7.133.28 | 7.133.28 |
| 7.146.x | 7.146.0 to below 7.146.8 | 7.146.8 |
| 7.161.x | Not listed as affected | Not applicable |
If the fix cannot go in yet
- Upgrade to a fixed build for your train (versions table); the target builds in the note also close CVE-2026-42016 and CVE-2026-82329. JFrog lists no workaround for this CVE. Cost: a service restart and upgrade testing.
- Restrict network access to the Access paths to trusted users and systems (Wiz). Cost: external consumers and remote users lose access unless they come through the allowed path.
- After upgrading, hunt for persistence from earlier exploitation and reset the Access token certificate if you find any, because stolen signing keys keep working after a patch. Cost: a reset invalidates tokens and needs a planned window.
What to look for
- Highest-confidence log signature (Wiz): a 401 on the bare AWS token path (/access/api/v1/aws/token) followed by a 200 on a variant of it, from the same client, within a short window. Normal clients do not produce that pattern.
- Chain follow-on: POST /access/api/v1/tokens returning 200, then requests whose actor is token:anonymous doing admin work such as PUT /api/security/users/
(Wiz). The sample grep for those requests is in the CVE-2026-42016 entry. - Actor IPs Wiz tied to CVE-2026-42018 exploitation: 186.247.79[.]240 (2 Sep 2026), 182.62.201[.]69 (4 Sep 2026), 121.123.141[.]155 (26 Aug 2026), and 149.102.229[.]150 (30 Aug 2026). Payload hosts, hashes and plugin names from the later stages of the chain are listed in the CVE-2026-42016 entry.
- Attackers may truncate request*.log in the Artifactory log directory, so missing or empty logs are themselves a sign of tampering (Wiz). Also check for binaries in world-writable paths such as /dev/shm, /tmp and /var/tmp.
Exploited 3 days after disclosure: disclosed 12 Aug 2026, first exploitation reported 15 Aug 2026.
Exploitation reported so far
Wiz Research says several actors chained this bug with CVE-2026-42016 between 15 Aug and 8 Sep 2026, and knew of no earlier public report. The usual shape was an unauthenticated POST that returned an anonymous token, a second POST that turned it into an admin token, then an admin account created within minutes in some cases. Wiz also recovered a custom Rust backdoor and malicious Groovy plugins from compromised instances.
Wiz measured that the share of organizations running Artifactory with a vulnerable instance fell only from 69% at publication (12 Aug 2026) to 62% four weeks later. Its figure for CVE-2026-42016 (59% six weeks after its 27 Jul 2026 publication) is a different CVE measured from a different date.
Why attack-path analysis settles it
On its own the bug yields only an anonymous-user token, so the version check shows it exists but not how much damage follows. Exposure becomes serious when the Access path is reachable and the same build is also open to CVE-2026-42016, which turns the token into an admin token. That is a question about the path an attacker can walk, so attack-path analysis fits.
Related pages
Sources
- CVE-2026-42018: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-42018: CISA KEV entry (feed version 2026.11.18), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-42018: JFrog security advisories (vendor advisory, CVE-2026-42018 section), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-42018: Wiz Research report, 10 Sep 2026, updated 17 Sep 2026 (the URL as Wiz publishes it, which NVD lists too), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-42018: JFrog documentation: Get Artifactory Version API, read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.