CVE-2026-76460: Cisco Identity Services Engine, is it exploitable where you run it
Code called: yesReached: openControl in front: noExploitation known: yesWalk it through the four questions
What the flaw is
CVE-2026-76460 is an authentication bypass (CWE-648, incorrect use of privileged APIs per CISA) in an API of Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) and ISE Passive Identity Connector (ISE-PIC). Cisco says insufficient authentication control on an API endpoint lets an unauthenticated remote attacker send a crafted request and gain unauthorized access to the device. Cisco describes the bypass as going around the web-based management interface.
ISE is the policy server that decides who joins the network, so control of it is control of network access. Cisco warns that on success an attacker may get command execution with root privileges. Cisco rates it 10.0 (CVSS 3.1 base score; network, low complexity, no privileges, scope changed, high impact on all three). It affects every ISE and ISE-PIC regardless of configuration, so there is no setting to check beyond the version and who can reach the node.
Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it
| Condition for exposure | How to check it on your system |
|---|---|
| a node runs a release below the first fixed patch for its train, or ISE 3.0 | Affected: an ISE or ISE-PIC node on a release below the first fixed patch for its train (3.1 Patch 12, 3.2 Patch 11, 3.3 Patch 12, 3.4 Patch 7, 3.5 Patch 4), or on 3.0, which is end of software maintenance. Run show version at the ISE CLI on each node. It prints the release and the installed patch level. In the admin portal, the patch management page lists installed patches. Compare every node with the versions table, since a node can lag its peers. Cisco's advisory names no ISE release earlier than 3.0 and its fixed table starts at 3.1, so a 2.x node is listed with no fix: treat it as affected and move it to a fixed 3.x train. Cisco says the flaw affects ISE and ISE-PIC regardless of device configuration, so no setting changes the result. |
| the attacker can reach the node's API | Per Cisco's ISE API documentation, the ISE API Gateway receives API requests on HTTPS port 443, and from release 3.1 the ERS, Open API and monitoring (MnT) APIs are all routed through it. ERS clients use port 443 (9060 can also be used) and Open API clients use port 443; between nodes the gateway uses 9070 for Open APIs and 9443 for MnT. Cisco's advisory names no port for this CVE, and the flaw is in an API endpoint behind the management interface, so treat 443 on every node as the port to test, plus 9060 and 9070 where ERS and Open API are enabled (both are off by default). On each node run show ports at the ISE CLI to see what listens, and show interface for its addresses. Then list which networks can open those ports: test from a normal user VLAN and from any guest or internet-facing network, and read the firewall rules and infrastructure ACLs in front of the nodes. Cisco's mitigation is to allow only required management and control plane traffic to the nodes. |
Affected and fixed versions
| Release | Affected | First fixed release |
|---|---|---|
| ISE 3.0 | All builds (end of software maintenance) | None: migrate to a supported release that has the fix |
| ISE and ISE-PIC 3.1 | Earlier than 3.1 Patch 12 | 3.1 Patch 12 |
| ISE and ISE-PIC 3.2 | Earlier than 3.2 Patch 11 | 3.2 Patch 11 |
| ISE and ISE-PIC 3.3 | Earlier than 3.3 Patch 12 | 3.3 Patch 12 |
| ISE and ISE-PIC 3.4 | Earlier than 3.4 Patch 7 | 3.4 Patch 7 |
| ISE and ISE-PIC 3.5 | Earlier than 3.5 Patch 4 | 3.5 Patch 4 |
If the fix cannot go in yet
- No workaround exists (Cisco). Upgrading to the fixed patch is the fix.
- Cisco's mitigation: use infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) to allow only required management and control plane traffic to the ISE nodes. Cost: any admin station, integration or device that talks to ISE from a network you do not list loses access, so inventory who calls ISE first. It reduces who can reach the API but does not fix the flaw.
- If you suspect compromise, Cisco strongly recommends re-imaging the affected nodes and restoring from a configuration backup if needed. Cost: node downtime and a rebuild, which also removes any attacker persistence.
- Check for compromise now, not after patching. CISA's KEV entry marks forensic triage as required with a three-day due date and ties the required action to BOD 26-04. This is the same step as Cisco's re-image advice: if the access.log review finds anything, or you cannot rule out use before the patch, treat the node as compromised and re-image it.
What to look for
- Cisco's indicator of compromise is a review of access.log for suspicious usernames, on every node of a distributed deployment. Cisco gives no list of suspicious names. A username is suspicious when it is not an account you created: compare the names in the log with your administrators (Administration > System > Admin Access > Administrators) and your API and integration accounts, and treat any other name, a random-looking string or a placeholder-style name as a hit. This reading is our guidance, not Cisco's.
- Cisco's example command is
admin#show logging application ise-kong/access.log | include dummyuser, where dummyuser is a placeholder for a suspicious username. Any entry in the output may indicate malicious activity. - For more access.log files, collect a support bundle with include debug logs selected and shared key encryption, then decrypt it and read ./ise/logs/apigateway/access.log.gz.
- After a root compromise, evidence may be hidden or removed on the node, so Cisco advises cross-checking network and firewall logs outside the device for unexpected uploads from the ISE node to external IP addresses and downloads from malicious IP addresses. Cisco publishes no indicator addresses.
The earliest dated mark of exploitation is CISA's, on 16 Sep 2026, the day of disclosure; exploitation may have begun earlier.
Exploitation reported so far
Cisco's advisory says its PSIRT is aware of active exploitation and gives no date. It says the flaw was found during the resolution of a Cisco Technical Assistance Center support case. CISA's SSVC data in NVD records exploitation as active, automatable as yes and technical impact as total.
Why attack-path analysis settles it
Every unpatched ISE node is affected whatever its configuration, so the version only starts the question. What separates a node under attack from a node that is merely unpatched is whether anything hostile can open an HTTPS session to its management interface, and that depends on the firewall rules, infrastructure ACLs and segmentation in front of each node. Mapping the paths from user, guest and internet networks to each node settles that, and active exploitation makes it urgent.
Related pages
Sources
- CVE-2026-76460: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-76460: CISA KEV entry (feed version 2026.11.18), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-76460: Cisco security advisory cisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5 (affected products, indicators of compromise, mitigation, fixed releases), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-76460: Cisco ISE API documentation (API Gateway on port 443; ERS 9060; Open API 9070 and MnT 9443 between nodes), read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.