CVE-2026-94545: Vercel Satori and Next.js, is it exploitable where you run it
Code called: openReached: yesControl in front: noExploitation known: noWalk it through the four questions
What the flaw is
Satori turns HTML and CSS into SVG. It does not properly escape some values before it writes them into the SVG output, so a crafted value can be read as SVG markup instead of plain text. In the Satori advisory, the impact depends on how the generated SVG is consumed.
Next.js ships Satori inside the Node.js implementation of ImageResponse in next/og. The Next.js advisory calls this an upstream vulnerability and rates it as remote code execution. It applies when an application passes attacker-controlled values into SVG content, attributes or styles during image generation. A typical case is a route that reads a query parameter and places it in the SVG.
The Edge implementation of ImageResponse is not affected, and neither are applications that never pass attacker-controlled values into the SVG.
Are you exposed: each condition and how to check it
| Condition for exposure | How to check it on your system |
|---|---|
| the app uses Satori or the Node.js next/og on an affected version | Run npm ls satori next in the project (or pnpm why satori), and node -p "require('next/package.json').version" in the deployed app directory; compare with the versions table. Then find the use: grep -rn "next/og" app pages src and grep -rn "satori" package.json. Open Graph image routes (opengraph-image files) and image API routes are the usual places. |
| attacker-controlled values reach the generated SVG | Condition in full: attacker-controlled values reach the SVG content, attributes or styles during image generation; for Satori used alone, the SVG must also be read by something that interprets SVG markup. In each ImageResponse route, trace every value placed inside the JSX tree: request URL parameters, headers, cookies and database fields that users can write. Vulnerable shape (the vendor's own example): a GET handler reads a query parameter with new URL(request.url).searchParams.get('value') and renders it as <svg width="1200" height="630"><title>{value}</title></svg>. Safe shapes: a route that renders only fixed text, or a value your own code picks from a fixed list, passes no attacker-controlled value into the SVG. For Satori used alone, find where the SVG string goes after Satori returns it: the Satori advisory states the impact depends on how the SVG is consumed, and output rasterized to PNG on your side differs from SVG served to browsers or passed to another service. |
| the ImageResponse route runs on the Node.js runtime, not Edge | Run grep -rn "export const runtime" app pages src. A route with export const runtime = 'edge' uses the Edge implementation, which the vendor says is not affected, while a route with no runtime export, or with export const runtime = 'nodejs', is on Node.js and is in scope. Moving a route to Edge means adding export const runtime = 'edge' to that route file; Edge runtime limits then apply to it. |
Affected and fixed versions
| Package | Affected versions | First fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| satori | 0.0.27 up to but excluding 0.33.5 | 0.33.5 |
| next (Node.js ImageResponse from next/og only) | 16.2.0 up to but excluding 16.3.6 | 16.3.6 |
If the fix cannot go in yet
- Next.js workaround from the vendor: if you cannot upgrade, do not pass attacker-controlled values into SVG content, attributes or styles rendered by the Node.js ImageResponse. Cost: dynamic text taken from users (titles, names, query parameters) must be replaced with fixed values or values you control, so personalized images stop working.
- Satori workaround from the vendor: no complete workaround exists besides upgrading. Applications that cannot upgrade should not render attacker-controlled content with Satori. Cost: the same loss of user-supplied content in generated images.
- Switching a route to the Edge ImageResponse implementation is outside the workaround the vendor lists, but the vendor states the Edge implementation is not affected. Cost: Edge runtime limits apply to that route.
What to look for
- Run the version and code checks from the checks table on every service. No indicators, log strings or file paths are published by the vendor or NVD for this CVE, and the vendor does not name a log source to check.
- Suggested hunt (not published by the vendor): in web server or CDN logs for your Open Graph and image routes, look for query-parameter values that contain markup characters, such as
<,>,%3C,%3E, or quotes, which a normal title or name does not hold.
No public report dates the start of exploitation.
Why static reachability settles it
Exposure needs an affected version on the Node.js ImageResponse and a data flow from user input into the SVG tree. Both are facts about the code, so tracing the data flow in the source settles it. A severity score cannot tell you this, since the two vendors rate the same flaw 9.5 and 5.3. See static reachability for what the method proves and misses.
Related pages
Sources
- CVE-2026-94545: NVD record, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-94545: vendor advisory (Next.js GHSA-vcvr-r3jv-pc5j, via the GitHub advisory API), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-94545: GitHub advisory API record for the Next.js advisory, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-94545: vendor advisory (Satori GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp, via the GitHub advisory API), read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-94545: GitHub advisory API record for the Satori advisory, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-94545: Next.js 16.3.6 release notes, read 19 Nov 2026
- CVE-2026-94545: npm registry record for satori (publish time of 0.33.5), read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.